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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a definition of Hypothesis Testing Equi-
librium (HTE) for general signaling games with non-Bayesian players
nested by an updating rule according to Hypothesis Testing model
characterized by Ortoleva (2012). An HTE may be different from
a sequential Nash equilibrium because of the dynamic inconsistency.
However, when player 2 only takes zero-probability message as an un-
expected news, an HTE is a refinement of sequential Nash equilibrium
and it survives Intuitive Criterion, but not vice versa. We provide exis-
tence theorem covering a broad class of signaling games often studied
in economics, and the constrained HTE is unique in such signaling
games. Keywords: Signaling Games, Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium,
Equilibrium Refinement.
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1 Introduction
Ortoleva (2012) models an agent who does not update according to Bayes’
Rule, but would “rationally” choose a new prior among a set of priors when
her original prior assigned a small probability on an realized event. He pro-
vides axiomatic foundations for his model in the form of a Hypothesis Test-
ing representation theorem for suitably defined preferences. Both the testing
threshold and the set of priors are subjective, therefore, the agent who fol-
lows this updating rule is aware of and can anticipate her updating behavior
when formulating plans.
In details, we consider the preferences of an agent over acts F which
are functions from state space Ω to a set of consequence X. If the prefer-
ence relation is Dynamic Coherence together with other standard postulates,
then the agent’s behavior can be represented by a Hypothesis Testing model
(u, ρ, ). According to this representation, the agent has a utility function u
over consequences; a prior over priors ρ; and a threshold  ∈ [0, 1). She then
acts as follows: Before any information comes, she has a set of priors pi ∈ Π
with probability assessment ρ over Π. She chooses piΩ with highest probabil-
ity ρ(piΩ) among all pi ∈ supp(ρ) as her original prior. Then she forms her
preference as the standard expected utility maximizer. As new information
(an event) A is revealed, the agent evaluates the probability of occurrence of
the event as piΩ(A). She keeps her original prior piΩ and proceeds Bayesian
update piΩ using A if the event A is not unexpected, i.e., piΩ(A) > . How-
ever, if piΩ(A) ≤ , she doubts her original prior piΩ and looks for a new prior
pi∗ among supp(ρ) such that pi∗ is the most likely one conditional on event
A, that is, pi∗ = argmax
pi∈supp(ρ)
P(pi|A), where
P(pi|A) = P(A|pi)P(pi)∫
pi′∈supp(ρ) P(A|pi′)P(pi′)dpi′
=
pi(A)ρ(pi)∫
pi′∈supp(ρ) pi
′(A)ρ(pi′)dpi′
.
(1)
Using this pi∗, she proceeds Bayesian update and forms her preference by
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maximizing expected utility.
Ortoleva (2012) applied his model in the “Beer-Quiche” game and defined
a Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium (HTE) when  = 0 for this specific game.
In this game, there exists unique HTE which coincides with the selection of
the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). This paper develops the
idea of nesting the updating model in general signaling games with finite
states and proposes a general concept of Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium.
For the general definition of HTE, we allow the testing threshold  ≥ 0. If
player 2 has a testing threshold  > 0, then she changes her beliefs when a
small (but non-zero) probability event happens. This dynamic inconsistency
leads to a result that an HTE may deviate from sequential Nash equilibrium.
However, we show that when  = 0, an HTE is a refinement of sequential
Nash equilibria. In this case, player 2 only considers the zero-probability
event as an unexpected event. In order to compare with other refinement
criteria, we mainly focus on the properties of this class of HTE. We have three
main findings: (a). As a method of refinement, an HTE survives Intuitive
Criterion, but not vice verse; (b). A general HTE exists in a broad class
of signaling games studied in economics which satisfy the Single Crossing
Property together with other standard assumptions. (c). We proposed a
concept of constrained HTE in which the set of alternative beliefs of player
2 is restricted to be around her original belief. We show that the constrained
HTE is unique under the previous assumptions. As an example, we present
this result in Milgrom-Roberts’ limit pricing model and we get a unique HTE
for each interesting case.
This paper focuses on the signaling games, a class of games where an in-
formed player (player 1) conveys private information to an uninformed player
(player 2) through messages, and player 2 tries to make inferences about hid-
den information and takes an action which can influence both players’ payoffs.
There is an enormous literature that analyzes and utilizes signaling games
in applications of a wide range of economic problems as reviewed in Riley
(2001) and Sobel (2007), see Spence’s model in labor market (Spence, 1974),
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Milgrom-Roberts’ model of limit pricing (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982), bar-
gaining models (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1983 ), and models in finance (Leland
and Pyle, 1977), for example. Typically, signaling games give rise to many
sequential Nash equilibria because under the assumption of Bayesian updat-
ing rule, at equilibrium, there is no other restrictions on the message m that
is sent with zero probability by player 1 except that player 2’s responses to
m can be rationalized by some belief of player 2. Therefore, the natural idea
to refine the sequential Nash equilibria is to impose additional restrictions
on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs as we can see in the literature reviewed in
Govindan and Wilson (2008, 2009), Hillas and Kohlberg (2002), Kohlberg
(1990), and van Damme (2002).
One branch of the refinement criteria, which has been widely applied in
signaling games in order to reduce the set of sequential equilibria, is motivated
by the concept of strategic stability for finite games addressed by Kohlberg
and Mertens (1986). The Intuitive Criterion, D1, D2 Criteria (Cho and
Kreps, 1987), Divinity (Banks and Sobel, 1987), for example, are all weaker
versions of strategic stability that are defined more easily for signaling games.
These refinements interpret the meaning of the out-of-equilibrium messages
depending on the current equilibrium, which means that, at a reasonable
equilibrium, sending an out-of-equilibrium message is costly and unattrac-
tive to player 1. There is also a branch of refinements trying to define a
new concept of equilibrium, for example, perfect sequential equilibria pro-
posed by Grossman and Perry (1986), different versions of Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE) discussed by Fudenburg and Tirole (1991), and forward
induction equilibrium defined by Govindan and Wilsons (2009) and modified
by Man (2012), Consistent Forward Induction Equilibrium Path proposed
by Umbauer (1991), etc. There is also a few refinements that are base on
the idea of hypothesis test, see Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite
(1993) and Ortoleva (2012), for example. There is no consensus in the liter-
ature that one refinement is better than the other. One refinement can be
favorable in some settings and unfavorable in other settings.
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All these refinements mentioned above are dealing with signaling games
with Bayesian players. However, the behavior of deviation from Bayesian
updating has been observed by psychologists1 and these experiments mo-
tivated a growing interest in properties of non-Bayesian updating, see, for
example, the model of temptation and self-control proposed by Gul and Pe-
sendorfer (2001, 2004), characterized axiomatically by Epstein (2006), and
extended by Epstein et al., (2008, 2010), models of learning in social net-
works by Golub and Jackson (2010) and Jadbabaie et al., (2012), arguments
of rational beliefs by Gilboa et. al, (2008, 2009, 2012) and Teng (2014), and
hypothesis testing model of Ortoleva (2012), etc. For signaling games with
non-Bayesian players, this paper proposes a concept of Hypothesis Testing
equilibrium, and provides a refinement based on the idea of non-Bayesian re-
actions to small probability messages according to Hypothesis Testing model.
The non-Bayesian updating rule is nested in the signaling games as follows:
Before player 1 moves, player 2 has a prior over a (finite) set of strategies
that player 1 may use and she chooses the most likely strategy that player 1
would use. After she observes a message sent by player 1, she evaluates the
probability of the message using her original belief induced by the strategy
of player 1. She keeps her original belief and uses it to proceed Bayesian
update if the probability of the massage she observed is greater than her
testing threshold. However, if the probability is less than or equals to the
threshold, she will discard her original belief (she thinks that player 1 may
use a different strategy from her original conjecture), then she looks for a
new belief which can be induced by another “rational” strategy of player 1
such that it is the most likely one conditional on the observed message. If
there exist such beliefs to support the occurrence of the messages (for both
on-the-equilibrium path and off-the-equilibrium path massages), then the se-
quentially rational strategies profile form an HTE. The difficulty is that how
player 2 selects the set of strategies of player 1 (which can induce a set of
1For example Tversky and Kahneman (1974), Camerer (1995), Rabin (1998, 2002),
and Mullainathan (2000).
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beliefs of player 2) and how to assign probability distribution over these pos-
sible strategies. Here we allow all the beliefs which can be “rationalized”
by at least one strategy of player 2 under consideration, which is a weak
restriction on the beliefs available to player 2.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly recall
the basic concepts and definitions from Ortoleva (2012) on the updating rule
of Hypothesis Testing model and the framework of general signaling games.
Section 3 is the heart of the paper, where we define the general Hypothesis
Testing Equilibrium (HTE), discuss the main properties of HTE and prove
the existence and uniqueness theorem. Section 4 compares the refinements
of HTE and Intuitive Criterion. Section 5 analyzes the HTE of Milgrom-
Roberts’ limit pricing model in a finite framework and section 6 provides the
conclusion and remarks.
2 Formulations and Preliminaries
2.1 The updating rule of Hypothesis Testing Model
Firstly we recall the basic concepts, definitions and main results of Hypoth-
esis Testing Model in general decision theory. Adopting the notations in
Ortoleva (2012), consider such a probability space (Ω,Σ,∆(Ω)), where Ω is
finite (nonempty) state space, Σ is set of all subsets of Ω, and ∆(Ω) is the
set of all probability measures (beliefs) on Ω. Write ∆(∆(Ω)) as the set of
all beliefs over beliefs. Let
BU(pi,A)(B) =
pi(A ∩B)
pi(A)
denote the Bayesian update of pi ∈ ∆(Ω) using A ∈ Σ such that pi(A) > 0.
As we discussed in the introduction, equation (1) gives the Bayesian update
of the second order prior ρ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)) using A ∈ Σ such that pi(A) > 0 for
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some pi ∈ supp(ρ). We denote it as:
BU(ρ,A)(pi) :=
pi(A)ρ(pi)∫
∆(Ω)
pi′(A)ρ(pi′)dpi′
.
Let’s consider the preferences of an agent over acts F which are functions
from state space Ω to a set of consequence X. For example, X could be a
set of possible prizes depending on the realizations of the state.
Definition 2.1. (Ortoleva, 2012) A class of preferences relations {A}A∈Σ
admits a Hypothesis Testing Representation if there exists a nonconstant
affine function u : X → R, a prior over priors ρ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)) with finite
support, and  ∈ [0, 1) such that, for any A ∈ Σ, there exist piA ∈ ∆(Ω) such
that:
(i) for any f, g ∈ F
f A g ⇔
∑
ω∈Ω
piA(ω)u(f(ω)) ≥
∑
ω∈Ω
piA(ω)u(g(ω))
(ii) {piΩ} = argmax
pi∈∆(Ω)
ρ(pi)
(iii)
piA =
BU(piΩ, A) piΩ(A) > BU(pi∗A, A) otherwise,
where {pi∗A} = argmax
pi∈∆(Ω)
BU(ρ,A)(pi).
Under this definition, if a decision maker’s preference is represented by
the updating rule according to Hypothesis Testing Model, then she proceeds
the update in the following procedure:
Step 0. The agent is uncertain about some important state of the nature.
Instead of a single subjective probability distribution over the alternative
possibilities, she has a set of probability distributions (priors) Π and a prob-
ability distribution (second order prior) ρ on Π, and supp(ρ) 6= ∅. The agent
has a subjective threshold  for Hypothesis Test.
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Step 1. Before any new information is revealed, the agent chooses a prior
piΩ ∈ supp(ρ) which is the most likely prior according to her belief ρ. In
this hypothesis test, piΩ serves as a null hypothesis and all the other priors
pi ∈ supp(ρ) as alternative hypothesis.
Step 2. As new information (an event) A is revealed, the agent evaluates
the probability of the occurrence of A as piΩ(A). The null hypothesis will
not be rejected if piΩ(A) > , and the agent can proceed Bayes’ rule to the
prior piΩ. However, the null hypothesis will be rejected if piΩ(A) ≤ . The
agent doubts her original prior piΩ because an unexpected event occurred.
The agent will choose an alternative prior pi∗ ∈ supp(ρ) which is the most
likely one conditional on the event A. Then she proceeds Bayes’ rule to the
prior pi∗.
This paper aims to nest the non-Bayesian updating rule according to the
Hypothesis Testing model into signaling games, therefore, we now briefly
introduce the general framework of signaling games with Bayesian players
first.
2.2 Signaling Games
Nature selects the type of player 1 according to some probability distribution
µ over a finite set T with supp(µ) 6= ∅ (For simplicity, we take T = supp(µ)).
Player 1 is informed of his type t ∈ T but player 2 is not. After player 1 learnt
his type, he chooses to send a message m from a finite set M . Observing the
message m, player 2 updates his beliefs on the type of player 1 and makes
a response r in a finite action set R. The game ends with this response and
payoffs are made to the two players. The payoff to player i, i = 1, 2, is given
by a function ui : T ×M × R → R. The distribution µ and the description
of the game are common knowledge.
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2.2.1 Sequencial Nash Equilibrium
A behavioral strategy of player 1 is a function σ : T → ∆(M) such that∑
m∈M σ(m; t) = 1 for all t ∈ T . The type t of player 1 chooses to send
message m with probability σ(m; t) for all t ∈ T . A behavioral strategy of
player 2 is a function τ : M → ∆(R) such that ∑r∈R τ(r;m) = 1 for all
m ∈ M . Player 2 takes respond r following the message m with probability
τ(r;m). We adopt the notations in Cho and Kreps (1978), write BR(m,µ)
for the set of best responses of player 2 observing m if she has posterior belief
µ(·|m).
BR(m,µ) = argmax
r∈R
∑
t∈T
u2(t,m, r)µ(t|m).
If T ′ ⊆ T , let BR(T ′,m) denote the set of best responses of player 2 to
posteriors concentrated on the set T ′. That is,
BR(T ′,m) =
⋃
{µ:µ(T ′|m)=1}
BR(m,µ).
Let BR(T ′,m, µ) be the set of best responses by player 2 after observing m
if she has posterior belief µ(·|m) concentrated on the subset T ′, and MBR
denote the set of mixed best responses by player 2. Since we concentrate
on the finite sets of T , M , and R, the sequential Nash equilibrium can be
defined straightforward.
Proposition 2.1. A profile of players’ behavioral strategies (σ∗, τ ∗) forms
a sequential Nash equilibrium (SNE) in a finite signaling game if it satisfies
the following conditions:
(i) Given player 2’s strategy τ ∗, each type t evaluates the expected utility
from sending message m as
∑
r∈R u1(t,m, r)τ
∗(r;m) and σ∗(·; t) puts weight
on m only if it is among the maximizing m’s in this expected utility.
(ii) Given player 1’s strategy σ∗, for all m that are sent by some type t with
positive probability µ(t|m) > 0 , every response r ∈ R such that τ ∗(r;m) > 0
must be a best response to m given beliefs µ(t|m), that is,
τ ∗(·;m) ∈ MBR(m,µ(·|m)), (2)
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where µ(t|m) = σ∗(m;t)µ(t)∑
t′∈T σ∗(m;t′)µ(t′)
.
(iii) For every message m that is sent with zero probability by player 1
(for all m such that
∑
t σ
∗(m; t)µ(t) = 0), there must be some probability
distribution µ(·|m) over types T such that (2) holds.
In an SNE, given the strategy of player 1, player 2 proceeds three steps:
she computes the probability of an observed messagem as P(m) =
∑
t∈T σ
∗(m; t)µ(t).
If P(m) > 0, that is, there exists some t ∈ T , such that σ∗(m; t) > 0, then
she uses Bayes’ rule to compute the posterior assessment µ(·|m), and then
she chooses her best response to m compatible with her belief µ(·|m). If
P(m) = 0, then there only needs to exist some belief µ(·|m) such that her
responses to the out-of-equilibrium message is rational.
What happens if player 2 is a non-Bayesian player? In the next section, we
aim to define an alternative equilibrium in such signaling games where player
2 uses non-Bayesian update rule according to Hypothesis Testing model.
3 Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium
3.1 Definition of HTE in general signaling games
In a signaling game, player 2 does not observe player 1’s strategies but the
messages sent by player 1, therefore, it’s helpful to imagine that player 2 has
a conjecture, σˆ(·; t), ∀t ∈ T , about player 1’s behavior. She attempts to make
inference using her conjecture. Similarly, player 1 also has a conjecture, τˆ ,
about player 2’s behavior and, at equilibrium, the conjectures (σˆ, τˆ) coincide
with the strategies (σ∗, τ ∗) that players actually use. Each one conjecture σˆ
of player 2 about player 1’s behavior induces a prior (belief) pi on the state
space Ω = T ×M . For every realization (t,m), pi(t,m) is the probability of
type t sending message m which is
pi(t,m) = σˆ(m; t)µ(t),
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and satisfies ∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
pi(t,m) =
∑
t
µ(t) = 1.
If player 2 is non-Bayesian player and her preference is represented by the
Hypothesis Testing model, then player 2 has a set of “rational” conjectures
(priors) and she has a probability distribution ρ on the set of conjectures
(priors). Firstly, we address some proper requirements for the second order
prior ρ.
Definition 3.1. Consider a finite signaling game Γ(µ) where player 2’s pref-
erence is represented by a Hypothesis Testing model (ρ, ). ρ is consistent if
it satisfies the following requirements:
(i). ∀pi ∈ supp(ρ), pi is compatible with the initial information of the
game, that is
∑
m∈M pi(t,m) = µ(t).
(ii). ∀pi ∈ supp(ρ), pi can be rationalized by at least one possible strategy
of player 2. that is, there exists some strategy τ : M → ∆(R) of player 2
such that pi(t,m) = 0,∀t ∈ T,∀m ∈M , if the type-message pair (t,m) is not
a best response to τ .
As addressed in Ortoleva (2012), the requirement for rationality is a weak
condition in the sense that player 2 can take any conjecture under consid-
eration as long as it is compatible with player 1’s best responding to some
possible strategy τ of player 2. Now we are ready to define Hypothesis Test-
ing Equilibrium in signaling games.
Definition 3.2. In a finite signaling game Γ(µ), a profile of behavioral strate-
gies (σ∗, τ ∗) is a Hypothesis Testing equilibrium (HTE) based on a Hypothesis
Testing model (ρ, ) if
(i). ρ is consistent.
(ii). The support of ρ contains piΩ induced by σ
∗ such that
piΩ = argmax
pi∈supp(ρ)
ρ(pi).
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Let
ME = {m ∈M :
∑
t∈T
piΩ(m|t)µ(t) > },
then for any m ∈M\ME, there exists some pim ∈ supp(ρ), such that
pim = argmax
pi∈supp(ρ)
BU(ρ,m)(pi).
(iii).For all t ∈ T , σ∗(m; t) > 0 implies m maximizes the expected utility
of player 1, that is
∑
r∈R
u1(t,m, r)τ
∗(r;m). ∀m ∈M ,
τ ∗(·;m) ∈ MBR(m,µ(·|m)),
where
µ(t|m) =
piΩ(t|m) =
σ∗(m;t)µ(t)∑
t′ σ∗(m;t′)µ(t′)
if m ∈ME
pim(t|m) = pim(m|t)µ(t)∑
t′ pim(m|t′)µ(t′) , otherwise.
The idea behind this definition is similar as Nash equilibrium except that
we allow non-Bayesian reactions for out-of-equilibrium messages when  > 0.
Therefore, the dynamic consistency is violated but only up to . However,
the dynamic consistency holds when  = 0 and the update rule is also well
defined after zero-probability messages. According to the definition, for a
given , in order to prove a profile of strategies is an HTE based on (ρ, ), we
just need to find a proper ρ to support the equilibrium.
Example 3.1. As an illustration, we apply this definition to the simple
game depicted in Figure 1. In this game, it’s very easy to check that there is
one separating sequential Nash equilibrium: the t1 type of player 1 chooses
message m1 and type t2 chooses message m2; player 2, regardless of which
message is observed, chooses r1. If player 2 has a threshold  = 5%, then
this equilibrium is an HTE supported by a Hypothesis Testing model (ρ, ),
where supp(ρ) only contains one element pi induced by the strategy of player
1. That is pi satisfies the following conditions:
pi(t1,m1) + pi(t1,m2) = 0.05, pi(t2,m1) + pi(t2,m2) = 0.95;
pi(m1; t1) = 1, pi(m2; t2) = 1.
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Figure 1
This prior (belief) pi can be rationalized by a strategy of player 2 which is
choosing r1 regardless of which message is observed.
In this example, there also exists an HTE which is not a sequential equi-
librium:
σ∗(m1; t1) = 1, σ∗(m2; t2) = 1;
τ ∗(r2;m1) = 1, τ ∗(r1;m2) = 1.
The support of ρ contains two elements pi and pˆi such that: 0 < ρ(pˆi) <
ρ(pi) < 0.9524, and
pi(t1) = 0.05, pi(t2) = 0.95, pi(m1|t1) = 1, pi(m2|t2) = 1;
pˆi(t1) = 0.05, pˆi(t2) = 0.95, pˆi(m1|t1) = 1, pˆi(m1|t2) = 1.
pi can be rationalized by the strategy τ ∗, and pˆi can be rationalized by choos-
ing r2 regardless of the message observed. Now let’s check that (σ
∗, τ ∗) is an
HTE supported by (ρ, ). Given τ ∗,
u1(t1,m1, τ
∗) = 3 > u1(t1,m2, τ ∗) = 0;
u1(t2,m2, τ
∗) = 3 > u1(t2,m1, τ ∗) = 2,
therefore, σ∗ maximizes player 1’s expected payoff for both types. Given σ∗,
player 2 starts with belief pi since ρ(pi) > ρ(pˆi) and keeps pi if she observes
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m2 since
pi(m2) = pi(m2|t1)pi(t1) + pi(m2|t2)pi(t2) = 0.95 > .
With the posterior belief pi(·|m2), observing m2, player 2’s best response is
r1. She switches to belief pˆi if she observes m1 since
pi(m1) = pi(m1|t1)pi(t1) + pi(m1|t2)pi(t2) = 0.05 ≤ ,
and
BU(ρ,m1)(pˆi) > BU(ρ,m1)(pi).
Therefore, observing m1, player 2 has the posterior assessments of pˆi(t1|m1) =
0.05 and pˆi(t2|m1) = 0.95. With this posterior belief, player 2 computes her
expected payoffs as:
u2(r1;m1, σ
∗) = pˆi(t1|m1)× 1 + pˆi(t2|m1)× 0 = 0.05;
u2(r2;m1, σ
∗) = pˆi(t1|m1)× 0 + pˆi(t2|m1)× 1 = 0.95,
which implies that r2 is the best response to m1. Therefore, (σ
∗, τ ∗) is an
HTE but it’s not a Nash Equilibrium, since r2 is not a best response of player
2 to the message m1 if she only has one belief pi.
3.2 Properties of Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium
From the previous example, we can immediately get the following property:
Proposition 3.1. In a finite signaling game Γ(µ), if a profile of behavioral
strategies (σ, τ) is an HTE supported by a Hypothesis Testing model (ρ, 0),
then it’s also an HTE supported by a Hypothesis Testing model (ρ, ), for all
 > 0.
Proof. Let ME0 and M
E
 denote the sets of messages which are sent with
zero probability by player 1 and less than or equal to , respectively. Then
ME ⊆ME0 . We can simply take
ρ = ρ = {piΩ, pim,m ∈M\ME}.
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Player 2 starts with piΩ = argmaxpi∈supp(ρ) ρ(pi), he keeps piΩ and proceeds
Bayesian update if she observed m ∈ ME . If m ∈ ME0 \ME , there exists
pim = piΩ such that σ and τ are sequentially rational. If m /∈ ME0 , there
exists pi′m which is identical with pim such that σ and τ are sequentially
rational.
As we can see in the previous example, if  > 0, then any message sent
with probability less than or equal to  is an off-the-equilibrium message.
Because of the dynamic inconsistency, an HTE may deviate from a sequential
Nash equilibrium. However, when  = 0, only the messages sent with zero-
probability are off-the-equilibrium path, therefore, it is not surprising that
there is a close relationship between this special class of HTE and sequential
Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3.2. In a finite signaling game Γ(µ), an HTE supported by a
Hypothesis Testing model (ρ, 0) is a refinement of SNE.
This requires no proof, it’s just a matter of definitions of HTE and SNE.
If a profile of strategies (σ∗, τ ∗) is an HTE supported by (ρ, 0), then for any
message sent by player 1 such that σ∗(m; t) > 0 for some t ∈ T , player 2’s
posterior belief derived by Bayesian update using σ∗. And for any message
sent with zero probability, that is, σ∗(m; t) = 0 for all t ∈ T , there exists
some belief on the side of player 2 to rationalize her behavior. In addition,
(σ∗, τ ∗) are sequentially rational. Therefore, (σ∗, τ ∗) is an SNE.
On the other side, according to definition 3.2, we require that any belief in
the support of ρ must can be “rationalized” by at least one strategy of player
2, which means, in addition to the requirement of equation (2), we impose
a further restriction on the off-the-equilibrium beliefs of player 2, therefore,
it’s not surprise that an SNE may not be an HTE supported by some (ρ, 0)
as the “Quiche-Beer” game in Ortoleva (2012). Here we also give a simple
example2 to show this property.
2This example is from Cho and Kreps (1987)
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the m' information set must put weight 0.5 or more on A being type 
t2. But for type t2, m dominates m'. So, by any of the tests 
constructed from the dominance criterion above, we can prune the 
type-message pair (t2,m') from the game. In the game that is left, B 
must respond to m' with r2. This causes the equilibrium outcome to 
fail the test, using either Step 2 or 2A, since this response causes t1 
to defect. 
The game in normal form is given in Table I. (Note that the 
prior enters into the expected payoff calculations.) We leave to the 
reader the simple task of verifying that the equilibrium in which A 
chooses m regardless of type and B responds to m' with r1 is indeed 
proper. (Moreover, it is easily shown to be perfect in the agent 
normal form.) 
This example can be used to make another point, concerning 
properness for signaling games. (The material in this paragraph is a 
bit esoteric, and it may be skipped without loss of comprehension of 
most of the rest of the paper.) Consider changing the prior on A's 
type, from 0.9 that A is t1 to 0.9 that A is t2. Since, to support the m 
equilibrium outcome, it is necessary that B "assess" high posterior 
TABLE I 
GAME OF FIGURE III IN NORMAL FORM 
Response 
ri r2 
Message if 
tl t2 
m m 0,0 0,0 
m m -0.1, 0.1 -0.1, 0 
m' m -0.9,0 0.9, 0.9 
m' m' -1, 0.1 0.8,0.9 
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As the game depicted in Figure. 2, (t1,m), (t2,m) is an SNE supported by
a belief of player 2 such that µ(t1|m) = 0.9 and µ(t2|m′) ≥ 0.5. But this is not
an HTE supported by (ρ, 0) because there does not exist a ρ such that supp(ρ)
contains a “rationalized” belief pim′ for the out-of-equilibrium message m
′. By
contradiction, assume that there exists pim′ such that pim′(t2|m′) ≥ 0.5 and
pim′ can be rationalized by some strategy of player 2. If pim′(t2|m′) ≥ 0.5,
then pim′(t2,m
′) > 0 which implies for any strategy τ rationalized pim′ , m′ is
a best response of t2 given τ . But for type t2, m
′ is strictly dominated by
m, which implies that there doesn’t exist such strategy τ such that m′ is a
best response of t2. This is contrary to the condition (ii) i the consist ncy
definition 3.2.
3.3 Exist nc of HTE
3.3.1 Definition, notations, and assumptions
Proposition 3.1 tells us that, in a signaling game, HTE supported by (ρ, )
exists if HTE supported by (ρ, 0) exists. And an HTE supported by (ρ, 0) is a
refinement of SNE, which interests us to compare our definition of HTE with
other criteria. Therefore, in the analysis to follow, we just need to restrict
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our attention on this class of HTE imposing  = 0. Since the mixed strategies
are not needed for the existence, we only consider the Pure Sequential Nash
Equilibrium (PSNE). A pure strategy of player 1 is a mapping s1 : T → M ,
and a pure strategy of player 2 is a response function s2;M → R.
Definition 3.3. In a finite signaling game Γ(µ), a profile of strategies (s∗1, s
∗
2)
forms a PSNE if there exists βm ∈ ∆(T ), ∀ m /∈ME, such that:
(i). Given s∗2,
u1(t, s
∗
1(t), s
∗
2(s
∗
1(t))) ≥ u1(t,m, s∗2(m)), ∀m ∈M, ∀t ∈ T,
(ii).Given s∗1, for any m ∈M , s∗2(m) ∈ BR(m,µ2(·|m)), where
µ2(t|m) =
β(t|m) if m ∈MEβm(t|m) otherwise,
and
β(t|m) =

µ(t)∑
t′∈Tm,s∗1
µ(t′) if t ∈ Tm,s∗1
0, otherwise,
where Tm,s∗1 = {t ∈ T : s∗1(t) = m}.
Before we go to the prove of existence, we provide some notations that
we may use in the statements.
Tm,s1 : the subset of types of player 1 who send message m under strategy s1,
that is,
Tm,s1 = {t ∈ T : s1(t) = m}.
ME(s1,s2): the set of on-the-equilibrium messages if (s1, s2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)),
that is,
ME(s1,s2) = {m ∈M : ∃t ∈ T, s.t.s1(t) = m}.
u1(t; s1, s2): the payoff of type t under strategy (s1, s2), that is,
u1(t; s1, s2) = u1(t, s1(t), s2(s1(t))).
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βTm ∈ ∆(T ): the probability assessment concentrating on types t ∈ Tm, that
is,
βTm(t) =

µ(t)∑
t′∈Tm µ(t
′) if t ∈ Tm
0 otherwise.
βt ∈ ∆(T ): the probability assessment concentrating on type t, that is,
βt(t
′) =
1 if t′ = t0 otherwise
We cannot be confident that there exists an HTE for a game that is
randomly selected from the space of signaling games with finite states, we
prove the existence theorem in the class of signaling games that satisfy the
following assumptions.
Assumption 1. T , M , and R are finite. The type of player 1 has a probabil-
ity distribution, µ ∈ ∆(T ), with full support. Further, ui(t, s1, s2) , i ∈ {1, 2},
exists and is finite for all t ∈ T and all nondecreasing functions s1 : T →M
and s2 : M → R.
Assumption 2. For any t ∈ T , for any fixed r ∈ R, if we connect the points
{u1(t,m, r) : m ∈M} in order by a smooth line, then u1(t) is strictly concave
in m, and u2 is strictly concave in r.
Assumption 3. First order stochastic dominance: ∀t ∈ T , ∀m ∈ M ,
∀β, β′ ∈ ∆(T ), whenever β stochastically dominants β′, that is∑
t′≤t
β′(t′) ≥
∑
t′≤t
β(t′), ∀t ∈ T,
and strictly inequality holds for some t ∈ T , then
u1(t,m,BR(m,β)) > u1(t,m,BR(m,β
′)).
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Assumption 4. Single Crossing Property:
(i). For all m > m′, and all t′ > t,∀r, r′ ∈ R,
u1(t,m, r) ≥ (>)u1(t,m′, r′), implies
u1(t
′,m, r) ≥ (>)u1(t′,m′, r′).
(ii). For all rˆ > r, and all mˆ > m, ∀ t ∈ T ,
u2(t,m, rˆ) ≥ (>)u2(t,m, r), implies
u2(t, mˆ, rˆ) ≥ (>)u2(t, mˆ, r).
Assumption 1 is primarily a technical assumption to fit our definition of
HTE. Assumption 2 insures that only pure strategies are under consideration
for both players. Assumption 3 says that all types of player 1 prefer the best
response of player 2 when player 2 believes that player 1 is more likely to be
a higher type. The forth assumption is the Milgrom-Shannon single crossing
property (SCP) for both players, which is a widely used assumption in the
signaling games to model many economic problems. It says that if type t
prefers a higher message-response pair (m, r) to a lower message-response
pair (m′, r′), then any higher type t′ > t also prefers the higher message-
response pair (m, r). This captures the idea that higher messages are easier
to send by a higher type. The utility of player 2 also satisfies SCP: if rˆ is a
better response to a message m sent by type t than r, then it is also a better
response to a higher message mˆ sent by t than r.
Before we proceed the existence theorem, let us review the concept of
lexicographically dominance introduced by Mailath. et, al., (1993).
Definition 3.4. In a signaling game Γ(µ), a strategy profile (s∗1, s
∗
2) ∈
PSNE(Γ(µ)) lexicographically dominates (l -dominates) another strategy pro-
file (s1, s2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)) if there exists j ∈ T , such that
u1(t; s
∗
1, s
∗
2) > u1(t; s1, s2) if t = j
u1(t; s
∗
1, s
∗
2) ≥ u1(t; s1, s2) if t ≥ j + 1.
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A strategy profile (s∗1, s
∗
2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)) is a lexicographically maximum se-
quential equilibrium (LMSE) if there doesn’t exist an (s1, s2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ))
l -dominates (s∗1, s
∗
2).
If we restrict player 1’s types in a subset of T , we can define a truncated
game from G. Formally, for any j ∈ T , let
T j = {1, ..., j}, µj(t) = βT j .
A truncated gameGj is defined by substituting T j for T , and the T j−conditional
prior µj for the prior µ in original game. Then we can get the following prop-
erties:
Proposition 3.3. Assume (s1, s2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)), ∀ j ∈ T , if s1(t) 6= s1(j),
∀t > j, then (sj1, sj2) ∈ PSNE(Γj(µj)), where sj1(t) = s1(t), ∀ t ≤ j, and
sj2(m) = s2(m) ∀ m ∈M .
The following lemma derived in Mailath et al (1993) is very important
in our proof. The reader is urged to read their paper to obtain a detailed
analysis of this result.
Proposition 3.4. Mailath et al (1993): Under A1-A4, suppose (s1, s2) ∈
PSNE(Γ(µ)), (sˆ1, sˆ2) ∈ PSNE(Γj(µj)), for some j ∈ T . Suppose further that
u1(j; sˆ1, sˆ2) > u1(j; s1, s2),
then there exists (s∗1, s
∗
2) ∈ Γ(µ), such that:
u1(t; s
∗
1, s
∗
2) ≥ u1(t; sˆ1, sˆ2) for all t ≤ j and
u1(t; s
∗
1, s
∗
2) ≥ u1(t; s1, s2) for all t > j.
That is, (s∗1, s
∗
2) l-dominates (s1, s2).
3.3.2 Existence of HTE supported by a Hypothesis Testing model
(ρ, 0)
Theorem 3.5. Under A1− A4, an LMSE is an HTE.
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In order to prove the theorem, we need the following critical results:
Lemma 3.6. (Athey, 2001): Under A1 and A4, there exists a PSNE in
Γ(µ).
Therefore, an LMSE exists. More over, both players play nondecreasing
strategies:
Lemma 3.7. Under A1 and A4, ∀ (s∗1, s∗2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)), s∗1(t) ≤ s∗1(t′) if
t < t′.
Proof. At equilibrium (s∗1, s
∗
2) , ∀t, t′ ∈ T ,
u1(t; s
∗
1, s
∗
2) ≥ u1(t, s∗1(t′), s∗2(s∗1(t′))).
Suppose s∗1(t) > s
∗
1(t
′) , and t′ > t, by assumption of SCP,
u1(t
′; s∗1, s
∗
2) > u1(t
′; s∗1(t
′), s∗2(s
∗
1(t
′))) = u∗1(t
′; s∗1, s
∗
2),
which upsets the equilibrium.
Lemma 3.8. Under A1 and A4, ∀ (s∗1, s∗2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)), s∗2(m) ≤ s∗2(m′)
if m < m′.
Proof. At equilibrium (s∗1, s
∗
2) , ∀m′ > m ∈M , since s∗2(m) is a best response
to message m for any t,
u2(t
′,m, s∗2(m)) ≥ u2(t′,m, s∗2(m′)).
Suppose s∗2(m) > s
∗
2(m
′), from assumption A4
u2(t
′,m′, s∗2(m)) ≥ u2(t′,m′, s∗2(m′)),
which is contrary to the fact that s∗2(m
′) is a best response to m′.
Lemma 3.9. For an (s∗1, s
∗
2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)), let
T (r) = {t ∈ T : u1(t,m, r) > u1(t; s∗1, s∗2)}, (3)
then under A1 and A4, T (r) is convex.
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Proof. For all t′, t′′ ∈ T (r), t′ < t′′, suppose ∃ t ∈ [t′, t′′], such that
u1(t,m, r) ≤ u1(t; s∗1, s∗2).
If m > s∗2(t), since t
′ < t, by A4, we obtain
u1(t
′,m, r) ≤ u1(t′, s∗1(t), s∗2(s∗1(t))).
And at equilibrium,
u1(t
′, s∗1(t), s
∗
2(s
∗
1(t))) ≤ u1(t′; s∗1, s∗2),
therefore,
u1(t
′,m, r) ≤ u1(t′; s∗1, s∗2),
which is contrary to the assumption that t′ ∈ T (r). We can analogously
prove the other case where m < s∗2(t) to get a contradiction with t
′′ ∈ T (r).
Therefore, ∀ t ∈ [t′, t′′], t ∈ T (r), which implies that T (r) is convex.
Given a response r of player 2 to message m, T (r) is the set of types who
are willing to deviate from the equilibrium strategy.
Lemma 3.10. If r < r′, then T (r) ⊆ T (r′).
Proof. ∀ t ∈ T (r),
u1(t,m, r) < u1(t,m, r
′)
u1(t,m, r) > u1(t; s
∗
1, s
∗
2).
The first inequality holds because of A3. Therefore
u1(t; s
∗
1, s
∗
2) < u1(t,m, r
′),
which implies that t ∈ T (r′).
This lemma implies that a higher response to message m induces more
types of player 1 to deviate from the equilibrium strategy. Now let us prove
Theorem 3.5:
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Proof. Let (s1, s2) be an LMSE in Γ(µ). In order to prove (s1, s2) is an
HTE, we just need to prove that for any out-of-equilibrium message m, there
exists a belief β(·|m) ∈ ∆(T ), such that s2(m) = BR(m,β(·|m)), can be
rationalized by some strategy s˜2,m : M → R. Then we can construct the
hypothesis testing model (ρ, 0) in which the support of ρ contains priors
derived from beliefs of on-the-quilibrium messages and out-of-equilibrium
messages. Suppose m is an out-of-equilibrium message. Let
Rm = {r ∈ R : ∃t ∈ T, s. t. u1(t,m, r) > u1(t; s1, s2)}. (4)
Case (i). Rm = ∅. In this case, no type would deviate to m from his
equilibrium strategy given any response of player 2, that is, β(t|m) = 0, ∀
t ∈ T . Such β can be rationalized by s2.
Case (ii). Rm 6= ∅. Due to lemma 3.8, let us consider rm = minRm, then for
all r > rm, ∃ t0 ∈ T ,
u1(t0; s1, s2) < u1(t0,m, r),
which implies that any β(·|m) ∈ ∆(T ) supporting the equilibrium (s1, s2)
must satisfy
BR(m,β(·|m)) < rm.
According to lemma 3.9, we can denote T (rm) = [i, j], where
i = min{t ∈ T : u1(t,m, rm) > u1(t; s1, s2)}
j = max{t ∈ T : u1(t,m, rm) > u1(t; s1, s2)}.
We denote mj = s1(j) and k = max{t ∈ T : s1(t) = s1(j)}. If m > mj,
then k = j by assumption A4. If m < mj, then u(t,mj, rm) > u(t,m, rm),
for all t ∈ [j, k] because of the concavity assumption A2. Now let’s consider
the k-truncated game Γk(µk). We claim that there doesn’t exist a profile of
strategies (sˆk1, sˆ
k
2) ∈ PSNE(Γk(µk)) such that sˆk1(t) = m and sˆk2(m) = rm for
any t ∈ [i, j]. Suppose, contrary to the assertion, there exists such equilibrium
(sˆk1, sˆ
k
2), and at equilibrium, ∃j0 ∈ [i, j],
sˆk1(j0) = m, and
sˆk2(m) = rm.
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We denote
h = max{t ∈ [i, k], sˆk1(t) = sˆk1(j0)},
h < j because either j = k or sˆk1(t) > m. ∀t ∈ [j, k]. By Prop. 3.3, (sˆk1, sˆk2) is
a PSNE in h-truncated game Γh(µh) by just simply dropping the strategies
of types higher than h, and
u1(h; sˆ
k
1, sˆ
k
2) > u1(h; s1, s2),
therefore, Prop. 3.4 implies that there exists (s∗1, s
∗
2) l -dominates (s1, s2),
which is contrary to the assumption that (s1, s2) is LMSE. This analysis
means that for any (sˆk1, sˆ
k
2) ∈ PSNE(Γk(µk)), BR(m,β[i,j]) < rm. Especially,
(s1, s2) is a PSNE of Γ
k(µk) by simply deleting the strategies of the types
higher than k, therefore, s2(m) < rm. To sum up the argument above, for
any out-of-equilibrium message m, for any belief β(·|m) ∈ ∆(T ), such that
s2(m) = BR(m,β(·|m)), can be rationalized by the strategy s˜2 of player 2:
s˜2(m) = rm,
s˜2(m
′) = s2(m′), ∀m′ 6= m.
For all t ∈ T (rm),
u1(t,m, s˜2(m)) = u1(t,m, rm)
> u1(t; s1, s2)
≥ u1(t,m′, s2(m′)) ∀m′ ∈M
= u1(t,m
′, s˜2(m′)) ∀m′ ∈M,
and for all t /∈ T (rm), ∃ s1(t) 6= m, such that u1(t,m, s˜2(m)) ≤ u1(t; s1, s2).
Therefore,
β(m|t) = 1, ∀t ∈ T (rm),
β(m|t) = 0, ∀t /∈ T (rm).
We can construct a Hypothesis Testing model (ρ, 0) in which
supp(ρ) = {piΩ, {pim : ∀m /∈ME(s1,s2)}},
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where
piΩ(·|m) = βTm,s1 , ∀m ∈ME(s1,s2)
pim(t|m) = β(t|m) = βT (rm), ∀t ∈ T, ∀m /∈ME(s1,s2),
with
ρ(pim) = 0, if m /∈ME(s1,s2) and Rm = ∅.
0 < ρ(pim) = ρ(pi
′
m) < ρ(piΩ) if m,m
′ /∈ME(s1,s2), Rm 6= ∅ and R′m 6= ∅.
By construction, (s1, s2) is an HTE supported by (ρ, 0).
3.4 Uniqueness of Constrained HTE
As we mentioned before, the condition (ii) for the requirements of consistency
of ρ is a weak condition in the sense that player 2 is allowed to take any
strategy as long as player 1 is rational to this strategy, which enlarges the set
of alternative beliefs of player 2. However, it is a natural idea if we restrict
the strategies of player 2 such that her alternative beliefs are around her
original belief.
Definition 3.5. An HTE (s1, s2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)) is called constrained HTE
if for any m /∈ ME(s1,s2), and Rm 6= ∅, for any posterior belief β(·|m) ∈ ∆(T )
such that s2(m) = BR(m,β(·|m)), then β(·|m) can be rationalized by
s˜2(m) = rm
s˜2(m
′) = s2(m′) ∀m′ 6= m,
(5)
where rm = minRm defined in Equ. (4).
Remark 1. In a constrained HTE, any belief of an out-of-equilibrium message
supporting the equilibrium can be rationalized by a strategy of player 2 which
is not far from her equilibrium strategy. This idea is quite intuitive, when
player 2 observes a message deviated from her original belief, she looks for the
most likely types who have potential incentive to send this message and forms
her new belief through only perturbing her original belief on this message.
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Remark 2. We notice that s˜2 may not be a best response to s˜1, only s˜1 is
required to be a best response to s˜2. If (s˜1, s˜2) forms an equilibrium, then at
this equilibrium, u1(t,m, rm) ≤ u1(t; s1, s2), ∀ t ∈ T . This case coincides with
the Consistent Forward Induction Equilibrium Path proposed by Umbhauer
(1991).
Remark 3. Go through the proof of the existence theorem, we can see that
an LMSE is a constrained HTE.
Proposition 3.11. Under A1-A4, LMSE is unique.
Proof. Suppose both (s∗1, s
∗
2) and (s1, s2) are LMSE, since (s
∗
1, s
∗
2) is not l -
dominates (s1, s2), for any t0 ∈ T , such that:
u1(t0; s
∗
1, s
∗
2) > u1(t0; s1, s2),
∃t1 > t0, such that
u1(t1; s
∗
1, s
∗
2) < u1(t1; s1, s2).
We have the same expression for (s1, s2), and T is finite, therefore, (s
∗
1, s
∗
2)
and (s1, s2) are identical.
Clearly, all other strategies profile (s1, s2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)) must be l -
dominated by the unique LMSE. Let us denote the unique LMSE as (sLM1 , s
LM
2 ),
Theorem 3.12. Under A1-A4, if the unique LMSE is complete separating,
and M is rich enough, then the outcome of constrained HTE supported by
(ρ, 0) is unique.
Lemma 3.13. Under A1-A4, assume (s1, s2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)) is a completely
separating equilibrium, let j = min{t ∈ T : u1(t; sLM1 , sLM2 ) > u1(t; s1, s2)}.
If ∀ t ∈ T , s1(t) 6= sLM1 (j), then (s1, s2) is not a constrained HTE.
Proof. If j = min{t ∈ T : u1(t; sLM1 , sLM2 ) > u1(t; s1, s2)}, We denote:
sLM1 (j) = m, s
LM
2 (m) = r
∗
j ,
s1(j) = mj, s2(mj) = rj;
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We assume that β(·|m) ∈ ∆(T ) is a posterior belief supporting the equi-
librium (s1, s2), then R(m) 6= ∅ since u1(j,m, r∗j ) > u1(j; s1, s2). Let rm =
minRm, then r
∗
j ≥ rm. Further, we can show that rm = r∗j . This is true
because of the following argument: By assumption, we have can obtain that:
u1(j,m, r
∗
j ) > u1(j,mj, rj) and
u1(j,mj, rj) > u1(j,m, s2(m)),
⇒u1(j,m, r∗j ) > u1(j,m, s2(m))
⇒s2(m) < r∗j
⇒BR(m,β(·|m)) < BR(m,βj),
since (sLM1 , s
LM
2 ) is a completely separating equilibrium. Therefore,∑
t∈T
β(t|m) < µ(j), and ∃t0 < j, β(t0|m) > 0.
Let
T (rm) = {t ∈ T : u1(t,m, rm) > u1(t, s1, s2)}.
By contradiction, suppose (s1, s2) is a constrained HTE, then β(·|m) can be
rationalized by s˜2 given in Equ. (5). And β(t0|m) > 0 implies that m is
a best response of t0, that is, u1(t0,m, s˜2) > u1(t0,m
′, s˜2(m′)), ∀ m′ ∈ M .
Therefore, t0 ∈ T (rm). However,
u1(t; s
LM
1 , s
LM
2 ) ≤ u1(t; s1, s2) ∀t < j,
which together with
u1(t; s
LM
1 , s
LM
2 ) ≥ u1(t;m, r∗j ),
implies that
u1(t,m, r
∗
j ) < u1(t; s1, s2) ∀t < j.
Therefore, ∀ r < r∗j ,
u1(t0,m, r) ≤ u1(t0;m, r∗j ) < u1(t0; s1, s2).
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Therefore, rm ≥ r∗j , which induces rm = r∗j . However, with this strategy s˜2,
u1(j,m, s˜2) = u1(j,m, r
∗
j ) > u1(j; s1, s2) ≥ u1(j,m′, s˜2(m′)), ∀m′ ∈M
which implies that j ∈ Trm . Therefore, β(j|m) ≥ µ(j). We have a contradic-
tion with
∑
t∈T β(t|m) < µ(j).
Now let us prove Theorem 3.12.
Proof. We just need to show that any (s1, s2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)) l -dominated by
(sLM1 , s
LM
2 ) is not a constrained HTE. For any (s1, s2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)), let
j = min{t ∈ T : u1(t; sLM1 , sLM2 ) > u1(t; s1, s2)},
and sLM1 (j) = mj. If mj is an out-of-equilibrium message under (s1, s2),
by lemma 3.14, we can get the conclusion immediately. However, if mj ∈
ME(s1,s2), according to our assumption, M is rich enough, we can select an
m slightly greater than mj but less than s
LM
1 (j + 1) such that m /∈ ME(s1,s2)
and form a new PSNE (s∗1, s
∗
2) by just perturbing (s
LM
1 , s
LM
2 ) at j. Then
(s∗1, s
∗
2) still l -dominates (s1, s2). This can be done because (s
LM
1 , s
LM
2 ) is
completely separating equilibrium. Again, lemma 3.13 implies that (s1, s2)
is not a constrained HTE.
Corollary. Under A1- A4, if there only exist completely separating equilibria,
then a “Pareto-dominant equilibrium” is the unique constrained HTE.
Proof. A “Riley equilibrium” maximizes the payoffs of all the types in the
completely separating equilibria set, which means that it is the unique LMSE,
therefore, it is the unique constrained HTE.
This proposition ensures that our HTE concept can catch the well-known
“Pareto-dominant separating equilibrium” or “Riley outcome” that is often
selected in applications.
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4 Comparison with Intuitive Criterion
Intuitive Criterion: (Cho and Kreps, 1987) Fixed a sequential equilibrium
outcome and let u∗1(t) be the payoff of a type t of player 1 in this equilibrium.
For each out of equilibrium message m, form the set
S(m) = {t ∈ T : u∗1(t) > max
r∈BR(T (m),m)
u1(t,m, r)}, (6)
If, for some out of equilibrium message m there exists a type t′ ∈ T such that
u∗1(t
′) < min
r∈BR(T\S(m),m)
u1(t
′,m, r), (7)
then the equilibrium outcome fails the Intuitive Criterion.
Proposition 4.1. In a finite signaling game Γ(µ), if (σ1, σ2) ∈ SNE(Γ(µ))
fails the Intuitive Criterion, it is also not an HTE supported by a Hypothesis
Testing model (ρ, 0).
Proof. If (σ1, σ2) ∈ SNE(Γ(µ)) fails the Intuitive Criterion, then for some
m /∈ME(σ1,σ2), ∃ t′ ∈ T , such that condition (7) holds. We prove that for this
m, any belief pim ∈ ∆(T ×M), such that
u1(t; s1, s2) ≥ u1(t,m,BR(m,pim(·|m))), ∀t ∈ T, (8)
there doesn’t exist a strategy of player 2 can rationalize pim(·|m). By con-
tradiction, suppose there exists s˜2 : M → R rationalizes pim(·|m), then for
any m′ ∈M , there exists a posterior distribution µ2(·|m′) ∈ ∆(T ), such that
s˜2 = BR(t,m
′, µ2(·|m′)). By the definition of S(m), m would never be a best
response of type t ∈ S(m) to s˜2, therefore,
pim(t,m) = 0, ∀t ∈ S(m),
which implies that BR(pim, T\S,m) = BR(pim, T,m). Since
u∗1(t
′) < min
r∈BR(T (m)\S(m),m)
u1(t
′,m, r)
≤ u1(t′,m, r), r ∈ BR(pim, T (m)\S(m),m)
≤ u1(t′,m, r), r ∈ BR(pim, T (m),m),
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type t′ could achieve a payoff strictly higher than his expected payoff at this
equilibrium by sending the message m. This is contrary to condition (8).
Example 4.1. We don’t need to restrict in pure strategies to get the propo-
sition above. The simple game depicted in Figure 3 provides an example to
show this property. There are two PSNE in this game. At the first one, the
Figure 3
strategies of player 1 and player 2 are given by:
σ∗(m1; t1) = 1, σ∗(m1; t2) = 1;
τ ∗(r1;m1) = 1,
(9)
This is supported by any belief of player 2 on out-of-equilibrium message m2.
We can easily check that this equilibrium can pass Intuitive Criterion and it
is also an HTE. The second equilibrium is:
σ∗(m2; t1) = 1, σ∗(m2; t2) = 1;
τ ∗(r1;m2) = 1.
(10)
This is supported by a belief such that µ2(t1|m1) < 0.5. Firstly, we check
that this PSNE can survive Intuitive Criterion. For the out-of-equilibrium
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message m1, we form the set
S(m1) = {t ∈ T : u∗1(t) > max
r∈BR(T,m1)
u1(t,m1, r)}.
Since
u∗1(t1) = 2 < max
r∈BR(T,m1)
u1(t1,m1, r) = u1(t1,m1, r1) = 3,
and
u∗1(t2) = 0 < max
r∈BR(T,m1)
u1(t2,m1, r) = u1(t1,m1, r1) = 1,
we have S(m1) = ∅. Therefore, there doesn’t exists some type t′ such that
u∗1(t
′) < min
r∈BR(T\S(m1),m1)
u1(t
′,m1, r).
Secondly, we can show that this PSNE is not an HTE. By contradiction, if
it’s an HTE, then for the out-of-equilibrium message m1, there must exist a
belief pi′ such that pi′(t1|m1) < 0.5, which implies that pi′(t2,m1) > 0. Then
according to the condition (ii) of the consistency definition 3.2 , any strategy
of player 2 that rationalizes pi′ must be such that m1 is a best response for
type t2. If we write such strategy of player 2 as φ(r1;m1) = x ∈ [0, 1] and
φ(r1;m2) = y ∈ [0, 1], then x and y must satisfy the following condition:
u1(t2,m1, φ) ≥ u1(t2,m2, φ)
⇒ 1 · x+ (−1) · (1− x) ≥ 0 · y + (−2) · (1− y)
⇒ 2x− 2y + 1 ≥ 0.
With such strategy, the payoffs of type t1 are:
u1(t1,m1, φ) = 3 · x+ 1.5 · (1− x) = 2.5x+ 1.5,
u1(t1,m2, φ) = 2 · y + 0 · (1− y) = 2y.
Since 2x− 2y + 1 ≥ 0x ∈ [0, 1], y ∈ [0, 1] ⇒ 2.5x+ 1.5 > 2y,
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which means that m1 is the unique best response for type t1. That is
pi′(m1|t1) = 1. Therefore
pi′(t1|m1) ≥ pi′(m1|t1)pi′(t1) = 0.6,
which is contrary to pi′(t1|m1) < 0.5.
5 HTE of the Milgrom-Roberts Model
In this section we present an example of simplified version of the Milgrom and
Roberts’ (1982) limit pricing entry model to illustrate how to find an HTE.
In this example, there are two periods and two firms. Firm 1, the incumbent,
has private information concerning his production costs. Firm 1 chooses a
first-period quantity Q1. In the second period, firm 2, the entrant, observes
the quantity and decides to enter the market or not. It pays a fixed cost
K > 0 if it enters. Then the private information is revealed and last stage of
the game played, either by both firms competing in a Cournot duopoly or by
only the incumbent acting as a monopolist3. Suppose there are two possible
costs for firm 1, (cL, cH). The common prior µ(c1 = cL) = 1−µ(c1 = cH) = x.
Firm 2’s cost c2 > 0 is common knowledge.
We assume that the inverse market demand is given by P (Q) = a −
bQ, a, b > 0. Let Πt1(Q1) denote type t of firm 1’s monopoly profit in the first
period if its production quantity is Q1, that is
Πt1(Q1) = (a− bQ1 − ct)Q1 t ∈ {L,H},
then it is easily to see that Πt1(Q1) is strictly concave in Q1. Let Q
L
M and Q
H
M
denote firm 1’s monopoly quantities that maximize its short-run profit when
its cost is low and high. With our linear demand function, we can explicitly
get
QLM =
a− cL
2b
and QHM =
a− cH
2b
.
3J. Tirole (1988) analyzed the similar model that the two firms play Bertrand Compe-
tition game if entry occurs
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Let ΠLM and Π
H
M denote the monopoly profits respectively, that is
ΠLM = Π
L
1 (Q
L
M) =
(a− cL)2
4b
and ΠHM = Π
H
1 (Q
H
M) =
(a− cH)2
4b
.
Since we assume (as Milgrom and Roberts, 1982) that firm 2 learns firm
1’s cost immediately if firm 2 decides to enter the market, we can explicitly
compute the two firm’s Cournot duopoly profits with complete information.
Πt1C =
(a+ ct − 2c2)2
9b
, and Πt2C =
(a+ c2 − 2ct)2
9b
−K,
where t ∈ {L,H}. We assume that the discount factors δ1 = δ2 = δ. To
make things interesting, assume that ΠH2C > 0 > Π
L
2C , which implies that,
under complete information, firm 2 enters the market if and only if firm 1 is
high cost type. And Ex(Π2C) < 0 which implies that firm 2 won’t enter the
market if it only has the prior information.
In order to fit our HTE concept, we assume that firm 1 only has four
choices of Q1, that is Q1 ∈ {QLM , QHM , QL1 , QH1 }, where Qt1 > QtM , ∀ t ∈
{L,H} and satisfy the following conditions:
ΠL1 (Q
t
1) + δΠ
t
M > Π
t
M + δΠ
t
1C . ∀t ∈ {L,H}
This condition implies that the low-cost (high-cost) type of firm 1 prefers to
deter the entrant by choosing a higher quantity QL1 (Q
H
1 ) if the monopoly
quantity QLM (Q
H
M) induces entry. Let Q˜
t
1 for t ∈ {L,H} denote the quantity
at which level the type t of firm 1 is indifferent in deterring and not deterring
the entry. That is
Πt1(Q˜
t
1) + δΠ
t
M = Π
t
M + δΠ
t
1C , for t ∈ {L,H}.
Due to the strictly concavity of Πt1(Q
t
1), we have Q˜
t
1 < Q
t
1. Now there are
only three interesting cases left to us to analyze the equilibria:
(i). Q˜L1 > Q
L
1 > Q
L
M > Q˜
H
1 > Q
H
1 > Q
H
M ,
(ii). Q˜L1 > Q
L
1 > Q˜
H
1 > Q
H
1 > Q
L
M > Q
H
M ,
(iii). Q˜L1 > Q
L
1 > Q˜
H
1 > Q
L
M > Q
H
1 > Q
H
M .
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In this example, we only consider the pure strategies of the firms, let
s : {L,H} → {QLM , QHM , QL1 , QH1 }
and
t : {QLM , QHM , QL1 , QH1 } → {0, 1}
be the strategies of firm 1 and firm 2 respectively. We can check that, in this
game, the assumptions A1-A4 are satisfied, therefore, an HTE exists.
Proposition 5.1. In case (i), there exist two separating PSNE:
s(L) = QLM , and s(H) = Q
H
M
t(Q1) =
 0 if Q1 ≥ QLM (PSNE 5.1.1)1 otherwise
and
s(L) = QL1 , and s(H) = Q
H
M
t(Q1) =
 0 if Q1 ≥ QL1 (PSNE 5.1.2)1 otherwise
Proposition 5.2. Under condition in case (i), both of the equilibria can pass
the Intuitive Criteria, but only the efficient separating equilibrium (PSNE 5.1.1)
is an HTE.
The proof is in appendix A.
Proposition 5.3. In case (ii), there exist two pooling PSNE and one sepa-
rating PSNE:
s(L) = s(H) = QLM
t(Q1) =
 0 if Q1 ≥ QLM (PSNE 5.3.1)1 otherwise,
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s(L) = s(H) = QH1
t(Q1) =
 0 if Q1 ≥ QH1 (PSNE 5.3.2)1 otherwise,
and
s(L) = QL1 , and s(H) = Q
H
M
t(Q1) =
 0 if Q1 ≥ QL1 (PSNE 5.3.3)1 otherwise
Proposition 5.4. Under condition in case (ii), all these three PSNE can
pass the Intuitive Criterion, but only the efficient equilibrium (PSNE 5.3.1)
is an HTE.
Proof is given in Appendix B.
Proposition 5.5. In case (iii), there exist one separating PSNE and one
pooling PSNE:
s(L) = s(H) = QLM
t(Q1) =
 0 if Q1 ≥ QLM (PSNE 5.5.1)1 otherwise
and
s(L) = QL1 , and s(H) = Q
H
M
t(Q1) =
 0 if Q1 ≥ QL1 (PSNE 5.5.2)1 otherwise
Proposition 5.6. Under conditions in case (iii), both of the PSNE can pass
the Intuitive Criterion, but only the efficient pooling equilibrium (PSNE 5.5.1)
is an HTE.
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We can use almost the same argument as the proof of prop. 5.4 to prove
this proposition. So we omit the proof here.
To summarize this analysis of the limit pricing entry deterrence model: In
each case, there exists a unique HTE. At an HTE, the hight-cost type firm 1
either chooses its monopoly quantity and allows entry or makes pooling with
the low-cost type and deters the entry depending on the cost of pooling.
The low-cost type choose its monopoly quantity and entry doesn’t occur. By
contrast, in each case, there exist multi equilibria which can survive Intuitive
Criterion. At separating equilibrium (PSNE 5.1.2; PSNE 5.3.3; PSNE 5.5.2),
even though it is costly for the high-cost type to pool with the low-cost type,
the low-cost type firm 1 still needs to sacrifice its short-run profit and chooses
a higher quantity to distinguish himself from the high-cost type. We argue
that this type of equilibrium can’t be an HTE because there doesn’t exist a
rational belief system to support the equilibrium when an out-of-equilibrium
message QLM is observed.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a general definition of Hypothesis Testing Equilib-
rium (HTE) in a framework of general signaling games with Non-Bayesian
players. We focus on the analysis of a special class of HTE with threshold
 = 0 as a method of equilibrium refinement which can survive the Intuitive
Criterion. For a broad class of signaling games, a Lexicographically Maxi-
mum sequential equilibrium is an HTE and the constrained HTE is unique.
In the example of limit pricing enter deterrence game, we show that there
exists unique HTE in each interesting case. However, there are aspects of
HTE we have not considered. In particular, the existence and uniqueness of
general HTE in more general signaling games, which we can’t get a concrete
conclusion. Natural extensions of HTE is to apply the concept in signal-
ing games in which the state space is infinite or for general dynamic games.
Without dynamic consistency, there will be some difficulties for these exten-
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sions. Nevertheless, a further study of the general HTE in dynamic games is
encouraged.
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APPENDIX
A. proof of proposition 5.2
Proof. To prove
s(L) = QLM , and s(H) = Q
H
M
t(Q1) =
 0 if Q1 ≥ QLM1 otherwise
is an HTE, we construct a Hypothesis Testing Model (ρ, 0) to support this
equilibrium. The support of ρ contains three elements: pi0, pi1, and pi2 such
that ρ(pi0 > ρ(pi1) = ρ(pi2) > 0. And they satisfy the following conditions:
(i). pii(L) = 1− pii(H) = x, ∀ i ∈ {0, 1, 2};
(ii). pi0(Q
L
M |L) = 1, pi0(QHM |H) = 1;
(ii). pi1(Q
L
1 |L) = 1, pi1(QHM |H) = 1;
(ii). pi2(Q
L
M |L) = 1, pi2(QH1 |H) = 1.
We can check that pi0 can be rationalized by the strategy
t(Q1) =
 0 if Q1 ≥ QLM1 otherwise;
pi1 can be rationalized by the strategy
t(Q1) =
 0 if Q1 ≥ QL11 otherwise;
and pi2 can be rationalized by the strategy
t(Q1) =
 0 if Q1 ≥ QH11 otherwise.
Firm 2 starts with pi0 and keeps it for Bayesian updating if it observes Q
L
M or
QHM .If firm 2 observes Q
L
1 , it switches to pi1 and proceeds Bayesian Updating
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because
pi1(Q
L
1 )ρ(pi1) = pi1(L)ρ(pi1) > 0
pi0(Q
L
1 )ρ(pi0) = pi2(Q
L
1 )ρ(pi2) = 0
Analogously, if firm 2 observes QH1 , it switches to pi2. Clearly, given the
strategy s of firm 1, t is a best response of firm 2. Given t, under the
condition in case (i), we have:
u1(L,Q
L
M , t(Q
L
M) = 0) > u1(L,Q
L
1 , t(Q
L
1 ) = 0),
u1(L,Q
L
M , t(Q
L
M) = 0) > u1(L,Q
H
1 , t(Q
H
1 ) = 1),
u1(L,Q
L
M , t(Q
L
M) = 0) > u1(L,Q
H
M , t(Q
H
M) = 1),
and
u1(H,Q
H
M , t(Q
H
M) = 1) > u1(H,Q
L
1 , t(Q
L
1 ) = 0),
u1(H,Q
H
M , t(Q
H
M) = 1) > u1(H,Q
H
1 , t(Q
H
1 ) = 1),
u1(L,Q
H
M , t(Q
H
M) = 1) > u1(H,Q
H
M , t(Q
H
M) = 1),
Therefore, (s, t) is an HTE.
Now let’s prove that
s(L) = QL1 , and s(H) = Q
H
M
t(Q1) =
 0 if Q1 ≥ QL11 otherwise
is not an HTE. We can check that when the out-of-equilibrium message QLM
is observed, for any µ2(·|QLM), such that
µ2(L|QLM)ΠL2C + (1− µ2(L|QLM))ΠH2C > 0,
there doesn’t exist a strategy of player 2 by which µ2(·|QLM) can be rational-
ized. Since ΠL2C < 0 < Π
H
2C , then µ2(H|QLM) = 1 − µ2(L|QLM) must be big
enough, which implies µ2(Q
L
M |H) > 0. By definition 3.1 (iii), any strategy
of firm 2 that rationalizes µ2 must be such that Q
L
M is a best response for
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type H. However, under condition in case (i), QLM > Q˜
H
1 , Q
L
M would never
be a best response for type H because QLM is strictly dominated by Q˜
H
1 .
Now let’s check that both of the equilibria can pass the Intuitive Criterion.
In PSNE 5.3.1, S(QL1 ) = {H}, and S(QH1 ) = {L}, however, there doesn’t
exist t′ such that condition (6) holds for QL1 and Q
H
1 .
B. proof of proposition 5.4
Proof. (PSNE 5.3.1) is an HTE supported Hypothesis Testing model (ρ, 0)
where the support of ρ contains four elements: pi0, pi1, pi2 and pi3 such that
ρ(piΩ) > ρ(pi1) = ρ(pi2) = ρ(pi3) > 0. And they satisfy the following condi-
tions:
(i). pi = 1− pi = x, for all pi ∈ supp(ρ);
(ii). pi0(Q
L
M |L) = 1, pi0(QLM |H) = 1;
(iii). pi1(Q
L
M |L) = 1, pi1(QHM |H) = 1;
(iv). pi2(Q
H
1 |L) = 1, pi2(QH1 |H) = 1;
(v). pi3(Q
L
1 |L) = 1, pi2(QHM |H) = 1.
(PSNE 5.3.2) is not an HTE. When QLM is observed, we show there
doesn’t exist a strategy of player 2 to rationalize any belief µ2 satisfying the
following conditions:
µ2(L) = 1− µ2(H) = x, and
µ2(L|QLM)ΠL2C + µ2(H|QLM)ΠH2C > 0.
By assumption:
ΠL2C < 0 < Π
H
2C and xΠ
L
2C + (1− x)ΠH2C < 0,
we can obtain that µ2(H|QLM) > x, therefore, µ2(H,QLM) > 0, which implies
that any strategy of firm 2 rationalizes µ2 must be such that Q
L
M is a best
response for type H. Since we restrict pure strategy, the strategy t : M → R
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must satisfy t(QLM) = 0. But with this strategy, Q
L
M is the unique best
response for type L, that is µ2(Q
L
M |L) = 1. Then
µ2(L|QLM) =
µ2(Q
L
M |L)µ2(L)
µ2(QLM |L)µ2(L) + µ2(QLM |H)µ2(H)
=
x
x+ µ2(QLM |H)(1− x)
≥ x,
which is contradiction with µ2(L|QLM) < x.
We can use the similar argument to prove that PSNE (5.3.3) is not an
HTE. There doesn’t exist rational prior to support the out-of-equilibrium
message QLM . We also can show that this equilibrium can pass the Intuitive
Criterion because any out-of-equilibrium message m ∈ {QLM , QH1 }, we have
S(m) = ∅.
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